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CITIZEN'S ARREST OR POLICE ARREST? DEFINING
THE SCOPE OF ALASKA'S DELEGATED CITIZEN'S
ARREST DOCTRINE
Lael Harrison
Abstract: When a citizen witnesses the commission of a misdemeanor, Alaska law allows
that citizen to arrest the offender on the spot. A citizen making such an arrest may request
assistance from a police officer rather than physically subduing the offender alone. However,
Alaska law does not clearly define how much assistance police may give before the citizen's
arrest becomes a warrantless police arrest. That distinction is particularly important in
misdemeanor arrests because Alaska follows the common law rule that citizens and officers
may make warrantless misdemeanor arrests only for those misdemeanors committed in their
presence. Officers may not make warrantless misdemeanor arrests merely upon citizen crime
reports. Therefore, when a citizen witnesses a misdemeanor and an officer does not, only the
citizen may legally arrest the offender on the spot. Nonetheless, the Alaska Court of Appeals
in Moxie v. State adopted the "delegated citizen's arrest" doctrine, holding that a citizen
making an arrest may "delegate" the task of taking an offender into custody to a police
officer who did not witness the misdemeanor. The court expressed agreement with
California's delegated citizen's arrest doctrine and endorsed the California courts' reasoning.
However, the Moxie decision itself did not expressly define the scope of such delegation,
leaving it unclear when a delegated citizen's arrest becomes an illegal warrantless police
arrest. This Comment analyzes Moxie and relevant California law, and argues that Alaska
should apply California's limits to delegated citizen's arrests. Applying such limits is
consistent with the policy behind delegated citizen's arrests and ensures the integrity of
Alaska's warrant requirement in such situations.

A woman sees a strange man walking out of her garage. She asks who
he is and what he is doing there.1 He gives her his name, says he used to
live there, and leaves. After he has left, she calls the police and reports
what she saw, providing them with the trespasser's name. The police
arrive and she signs a "citizen's arrest form." Forty-five minutes after
the offense, the police find the trespasser in a store five miles away from
the woman's home. The police arrest the suspect without a warrant and
take him to jail. Meanwhile, in another part of town, employees of a
store witness a customer shoplifting. They apprehend him and escort

1. This example has been adapted from a police report of a delegated citizen's arrest made in
Alaska in 2006. JUNEAU POLICE DEP'T, POLICE REPORT [hereinafter Trespasser Fact Pattern] (on
file with author; all potentially identifying information and details have been removed). Criminal
trespass is a misdemeanor in Alaska. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.320 (2006) (first degree criminal
trespass); id. § 11.46.330 (second degree criminal trespass).
2. This example has been adapted from a separate police report of a delegated citizen's arrest
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him to the front of the store. He shoves one of the employees and runs
off. They call the police and report that he has run to a building across
the street. A police officer arrives, chases the suspect through the
building, catches him, and takes him back to the store where the
employees identify him as the shoplifter. The officer asks the employees
to sign a citizen arrest form, then takes him to jail.
Although both cases were treated as citizen's arrests, certain features
distinguish the two arrests. In the arrest of the trespasser, a great deal of
time passed between the commission of the crime and the eventual
arrest. The witnessing citizen did not participate in the arrest beyond
reporting the crime. In the arrest of the shoplifter, by contrast, the citizen
witnesses were actively involved in the arrest, having attempted to
physically restrain the offender. They directed the actions of the police
and allowed no unreasonable delay between the crime and the arrest.
This Comment analyzes Alaska law in order to clarify when such
arrests are legal citizen's arrests, and when they are illegal warrantless
police arrests. The police in these examples could not legally have
arrested either offender without a warrant,3 but they proceeded to make
the arrests under the "delegated citizen's arrest" doctrine. Although
Alaska law allows citizens making arrests to "delegate" certain
responsibilities to police officers, 4 the scope of the delegated citizen's
arrest doctrine remains ill-defined. In particular, Alaska law does not
state what responsibilities a citizen may delegate before the officer's
involvement renders the citizen's arrest indistinguishable from an illegal
police arrest.
Delegated citizen's arrests occur when the citizen has the authority to
arrest without a warrant and the officer does not.5 In Alaska, police may
make warrantless misdemeanor arrests only for those misdemeanors
6
committed in their presence. The same restriction applies to citizen's
made in Alaska in 2006. JUNEAU POLICE DEP'T, POLICE REPORT [hereinafter Shoplifter Fact
Pattern] (on file with author; all potentially identifying information and details have been removed).
Shoplifting is a misdemeanor in Alaska. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.150 (theft in the fourth degree).
3. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030.
4. See Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990, 991 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
5. See id. (holding a delegated citizen's arrest legal where the citizen had authority to arrest
without a warrant and the officer did not). Rather than making a warrantless arrest under the
delegated citizen's arrest doctrine, an officer wishing to arrest for a misdemeanor that he or she did
not witness may obtain an arrest warrant or, alternatively, issue the offender a citation. ALASKA
STAT. § 12.25.180.
6. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030. Certain enumerated misdemeanors are exempted in this
section from the requirement for police arrests. Id. § 12.25.030(b).

Delegated Citizen's Arrests
arrests. 7 Consequently, when a citizen witnesses the commission of a
misdemeanor but an officer does not, a citizen's arrest is legal but a
warrantless police arrest is not.8 Furthermore, unnecessary delay will
render both officer and citizen arrests invalid. 9
In Moxie v. State,'0 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that an
otherwise legal citizen's arrest was valid even though an officer without
independent arrest authority assisted the citizen in taking the offender
into custody." The officer had not witnessed the misdemeanor, and2
therefore could not have made the warrantless arrest himself.'
Nevertheless, the court held the arrest was legal, reasoning that the
citizen had made the arrest and delegated
the task of taking the offender
3
into custody to the police officer. 1
In justifying its holding in Moxie, the court relied exclusively on
California delegated citizen's arrest case law' 4 but did not explicitly
define the scope of delegated citizen's arrests in Alaska.15 Neither the
Alaska judiciary nor legislature have clarified the doctrine since Moxie
was decided in 1983. Despite this lack of clarity, police currently make
warrantless misdemeanor arrests in a wide variety of situations.16
The California Court of Appeals defined the scope and limits of
California's delegated citizen's arrest doctrine before Moxie was
decided. 17 California applies the common law delay prohibition to
delegated citizen's arrests. The common law requires that citizens
making arrests act promptly and without unnecessary delay after
witnessing the crime.' 8 In addition, citizens are required to show intent
7. See id. at § 12.25.030(a)(1).
8. See id.
9. See Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 677-78 (Alaska 1969).
10. 662 P.2d 990 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
11. Id. at 991.
12. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030.
13. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991.
14. See id. ("We agree with the position taken by the California Court of Appeals: in this
situation, a peace officer must be regarded as an agent of the person making the arrest.").
15. See id. at 990-91.
16. See Trespasser Fact Pattern, supra note 1; Shoplifter Fact Pattern, supra note 2; see also
JUNEAU POLICE DEP'T, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES, Pt. 3, Ch. "Arrest-Citizen's Arrest"
(1993) (instructing officers to assist citizens invoking authority to arrest).
17. See People v. Richards, 140 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); see also Moxie, 662
P.2d at 991; infra Part III.
18. See, e.g., People v. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) ("Promptness... is
the only remaining requirement of a valid citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant.").
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to arrest by taking substantial action to further the arrest and giving
specific information to the assisting officer.1 9 A citizen who calls the
police to report witnessing a misdemeanor and then leaves the police to
act independently when they arrive is considered merely a witness,
having shown insufficient intent to be an arresting citizen.2 °
This Comment argues that Alaska should impose the same limits on
delegated citizen's arrests as the California courts.2 ' Without such
limitations, police may make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors based
on citizen reports alone, undermining Alaska's warrant requirement.
Specifically, Alaska should require that citizens act with intent, and
without unnecessary delay, to make valid delegated citizen's arrests.
California's standards for delay and intent are consistent with Moxie and
underlying policy concerns that citizens should be able to ensure their
own safety by delegating the physically dangerous aspects of arrest to an
officer.
Part I of this Comment discusses the common law rule, followed in
Alaska, that police officers and private citizens may only make
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed in their presence by
acting without delay. Part II examines Alaska's adoption of the
delegated citizen's arrest doctrine in Moxie v. State and the California
case law on which it relies. Part III analyzes the limits California courts
have placed on delegated citizen's arrests. Finally, Part IV argues that
Alaska should apply California's limits on delegated citizen's arrests as
they preserve the warrant requirement and are consistent with Moxie's
holding and underlying policy concerns.

19. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding a
delegated citizen's arrest legal where the citizen observed an offense, called the police, followed
and located the offender, and told the police where to find him).
20. See Richards, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
21. Although courts do not expressly refer to "delegated citizen's arrests," for clarity and
expediency this Comment will use that term when referring to the type of arrests at issue in this
Comment: arrests in which an arresting citizen witnesses a misdemeanor, reports it to the police,
and an officer who did not witness the offense takes physical custody of the offender. when
addressing this type of arrest, courts use the verb "delegate" most consistently, although they also
refer to police "aiding" citizens and to police as "agents" of citizens. See, e.g., Moxie, 662 P.2d at
991 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (using all three terms). This Comment uses the term "delegated
citizen's arrest" to distinguish such arrests from other police-assisted citizen's arrests in which an
officer also saw the offense and, with the citizen, took custody of the offender.

Delegated Citizen's Arrests
I.

ALASKA FOLLOWS THE "IN THE PRESENCE" RULE FOR
WARRANTLESS MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS

Alaska follows the common law rule that police and citizens may
only make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed in their
presence. Both the state legislature and courts have demonstrated a
commitment to preserving the "in the presence" rule for most
misdemeanors in Alaska.23 Alaska also follows the common law rule
that a person wishing to make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest must
make the arrest without unnecessary delay.24
A.

WarrantlessMisdemeanorArrests Generally Require that the
MisdemeanorBe Committed in the Presence of the Arresting
Person

Alaska follows the long-standing common law rule that police officers
and private citizens may only make warrantless arrests for those
misdemeanors committed in their presence.25 As the U.S. Supreme Court
has thus far declined to rule on whether the "in the presence"
requirement is mandated by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 26 states are currently free to adopt or reject it. Most states,
like Alaska, have codified some form of the rule. 7
Although the Alaska Legislature and courts have created some
exceptions to the "in the presence rule," they have nevertheless
22. ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030(a)(1) (2006); see also 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 13 (2004) ("Ordinarily,
a private person may arrest without a warrant one committing a misdemeanor or a breach of the
peace in his or her presence."); id. § 18 (2004) ("A peace officer may make a warrantless arrest of a
person who, in the officer's presence, is committing a misdemeanor.").
23. See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
24. See Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 677-78 (Alaska 1969) ("In order to justify a delay, there
should be a continued attempt on the part of the officer or person apprehending the offender to make
the arrest; he cannot delay for any purpose which is foreign to the accomplishment of the arrest."
(quoting Jackson v. Superior Court, 219 P.2d 879, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)); see also 5 Am. JUR.
2D Arrest § 55 (1995) ("The arrest must be made at the time the offense, or some part of it, is being
committed, or within a prompt and reasonable time after its commission, or upon fresh and
immediate pursuit of the offender.").
25. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030; see also William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor
Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 771, 788 (1993) (citing Regina v. Tooley, 92
Eng. Rep. 349 (1710)).
26. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.1 1 (2001) ("We need not, and thus do
not, speculate whether the Fourth Amendment entails an 'in the presence' requirement for purposes
of misdemeanor arrests.").
27. See id. at 355-60 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court).
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preserved the rule for the majority of misdemeanors. Alaska courts have
never squarely decided whether the Alaska Constitution requires the "in
the presence" rule.28 However, Alaska courts have indicated that
statutory exceptions to the rule for certain misdemeanors are
constitutional where the legislature finds "hardship" or "exigent
circumstances. 29 Within this authorization, the Alaska Legislature has
created limited exceptions to the "in the presence" rule for
misdemeanor-level drunk driving, domestic violence, and violation of
prisoner release conditions. 30 The brief legislative history on these
statutory exceptions indicates that the legislature determined that the
potential danger to the public posed by these particular misdemeanors
warranted an exception to the "in the presence" rule, but intended to
preserve the rule generally.3'
B.

Alaska Follows the Common Law Rule that UnnecessaryDelay
Invalidates Otherwise Valid WarrantlessArrests

Alaska also follows the common law requirement that warrantless "in
the presence" misdemeanor arrests take place without unnecessary
delay.32 Delay after witnessing a misdemeanor for purposes unrelated to
making an arrest invalidates the power to arrest without a warrant. 33 The
Alaska Supreme Court has indicated that delay for matters corollary to

28. See Proctor v. State, 643 P.2d 5, 7 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (declining to consider whether the
federal or Alaska constitutions require "in the presence" rule).
29. See Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043, 1050 n.34 (Alaska 1975) (advising the Legislature,
before passage of a DUI exception: "[iln other drunk driving cases, if the arrest requirement works a
hardship, Alaska's arrest laws could be modified, as has been done in other states"); see also
Proctor, 643 P.2d at 7 (upholding DUI exception statute and noting "[w]e conclude that the
legislature has determined that exigent circumstances exist where there is probable cause to believe
a suspect is driving while intoxicated").
30. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.25.030, 12.25.033 (2006).
31. See Minutes of Alaska House Judiciary Committee (May 19 & 22, 1975) (discussing Alaska
Senate Bill 182, indicating concern regarding the potential for "abuse" of the DUI exception, and
eventually amending the proposed blanket exception to a limited eight-hour window after the
offense). The eight-hour window limitation is still in effect. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.033.
32. See Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 677-78 (Alaska 1969) ("In order to justify a delay, there
should be a continued attempt on the part of the officer or person apprehending the offender to make
the arrest; he cannot delay for any purpose which is foreign to the accomplishment of the arrest."
(quoting Jackson v. Superior Court, 219 P.2d 879, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950))).
33. See Herrin,449 P.2d at 677-78; State v. Warren, 709 P.2d 194, 201 (N.M. 1985) (citing the
common law rule and holding that delay for the sake of "convenience" is unnecessary and thus
invalid).

Delegated Citizen's Arrests
the arrest, such as securing the area or chasing a fleeing34offender, is
necessary delay that does not destroy the authority to arrest.
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not considered a case of
delay in citizen's arrest, at common law the prohibition on unnecessary
delay applies to citizen's arrests as well as police arrests. 35 Generally,
courts have held that a delay by a citizen making an arrest to seek and
wait for assistance does not invalidate an otherwise legal citizen's
arrest. 36 However, the citizen's attention must be focused solely on
making the arrest throughout the delay.37 Although the Alaska Supreme
Court has never directly considered delay in a citizen's arrest, it has held
that the delay prohibition applies to police arrests and indicated that it
also applies to citizen's arrests.38
In sum, Alaska follows the common law "in the presence" rule for
almost all misdemeanors. Although neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor
the Alaska Supreme Court has ever decided whether this rule is a
constitutional mandate, the Alaska Legislature and courts have preserved
the rule. Alaska also follows the common law prohibition against
unnecessary delay for warrantless arrest by an officer, and has indicated
that it will do so for citizen's arrests as well.

34. See Herrin, 449 P.2d at 677-78 (holding that short delay by officer to remove another woman
from the building for her safety and to wait for reinforcements was reasonable and did not invalidate
the arrest); see also id. at 678 n. 16 ("[T]here may be justification for delay, as for instance, when the
interval between the commission of the offense and the actual arrest is spent by the officer in
pursuing the offender, or in summoning assistance where such may reasonably appear to be
necessary." (quoting Smith v. State, 87 So. 2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1956))).
35. See 6A C.J.S. § 13 (2004) ("If a private person fails to make an arrest immediately after
commission of the offense, his or her power to do so is extinguished and a subsequent arrest is
illegal.").
36. See, e.g., Hill v. Levy, 256 P.2d 622, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (finding short delay reasonable
during which the arresting citizen confronted and argued with the offender, sought help from an
uncooperative hotel manager, and then sought help from the police);. Ogulin v. Jeffries, 263 P.2d 75,
77-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
37. See Herrin, 449 P.2d at 678.
38. See id. (noting that the rule prohibiting unnecessary delay applied to the "officer or person
apprehendingthe offender" (emphasis added)).
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THE MOXIE COURT AGREED WITH CALIFORNIA CASE
LAW WHEN IT ADOPTED THE DELEGATED CITIZEN'S
ARREST DOCTRINE

In 1983, the Alaska Court of Appeals adopted the delegated
citizen's arrest doctrine in Moxie v. State.39 The underlying facts of
Moxie were simple, and the court reached its holding in a short opinion
with little discussion. 40 Relying exclusively on California case law,
which expressed policy concerns about citizen safety, 41 the court held in
Moxie that an arresting citizen may "delegate" the task of taking
physical custody of an offender to a police officer.4 2 However, Moxie did
not define the scope of the newly-created delegated citizen's arrest
doctrine. Alaska courts have not addressed any of the ambiguities
created by Moxie, yet police in the state continue to rely on the delegated
citizen's arrest doctrine in arresting misdemeanor offenders in a wide
variety of situations.43
A.

Moxie Adopted the Delegated Citizen's Arrest Doctrine in a Short
Opinion Based on Simple Underlying Facts

In Moxie, the Alaska Court of Appeals filed a brief opinion adopting
the delegated citizen's arrest doctrine. 4 Mr. Moxie challenged his
conviction for resisting arrest, arguing that he had been arrested illegally
because the police officer who took him into custody did not witness
him commit the misdemeanor.4 5 While acknowledging that the police
officer did not witness the misdemeanor, the court held Mr. Moxie's
arrest to be a valid citizen's arrest. 46 The court found that the citizen who
had witnessed the misdemeanor properly delegated the task of taking
Mr. Moxie into custody to the officer.4 7
39. 662 P.2d 990 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
40. See id. at 991.
41. See id.; Green v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 137 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
People v. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 835-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). Moxie cites Green and Sjosten as
a examples of the California law on which it relies. Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991.
42. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991.

43. See infra Part II.D (discussing Trespasser Fact Pattern, supra note 1, and Shoplifter Fact
Pattern, supra note 2).
44. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.

Delegated Citizen's Arrests
The facts of Moxie are straightforward.48 Mr. Moxie assaulted a hotel
manager, Ms. Robinson. 49 When the police officer arrived at the hotel,
Mr. Moxie had already been physically restrained.5 ° Ms. Robinson
informed the officer that she wanted to press charges. She signed a
citizen's arrest form and asked the officer to take Mr. Moxie into
custody, which he did. 5'
On these facts, the court held that the officer properly assisted Ms.
Robinson in making a citizen's arrest. 52 "Certainly," the court wrote, "it
is not the sole responsibility of a person making a citizen's arrest to
subdue, control and transport the arrestee into the formal custody of the
state. 53 The court described the officer as an "agent" of Ms. Robinson,
who had "initiated" the arrest and validly delegated the task of taking
Mr. Moxie into custody to the officer.54
B.

In Adopting the DelegatedCitizen's Arrest Doctrine,Moxie
Approvingly Cited CaliforniaCases That Express a Policy
Concernfor the Safety ofArresting Citizens

The court in Moxie expressly agreed with the delegated citizen's
arrest doctrine developed by the California appellate courts, citing four
California cases to support its adoption of the doctrine. 55 These cases
express a policy concern for the physical safety of the citizen making the
arrest. 56 The policy concern is most apparent in those cases in which the
48. See id.
49. See id. at 990-91.
50. See id. at 991. Presumably, Ms. Robinson and other hotel patrons and staff restrained Mr.
Moxie, although the opinion does not say.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id. ("We agree with the position taken by the California Court of Appeals: in this
situation, a peace officer must be regarded as an agent of the person making the arrest."). At the
time, California was the only state with a delegated citizen's arrest doctrine. Two other states have
since adopted the doctrine, citing California law with approval. See State v. Sutherland, 943 P.2d
62, 65 (Idaho 1997) ("We agree with the decisions of the Alaska and California courts and hold that
a police officer can act as an agent of a citizen who summons assistance in aid of making a citizen's
arrest."); Burke v. State, 125 P.3d 685, 689 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) ("We find the reasoning of the
California court persuasive ....).
56. See In re Roland K., 147 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding delegated citizen's arrest
legal where private security guard detained boy after catching him throwing rocks, and then turned
him over to a police officer); Green v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 137 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (holding delegated citizen's arrest legal where citizen followed a drunk driver until she
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arresting citizen did not physically confront the offender.57 However, all
four opinions characterize the officer's role as providing physical
assistance to the arresting citizen.58
The concern is prominent in the two cases in which the citizen did not
physically confront the offender. 59 Both of these cases discuss the right
of an arresting citizen to ask for help. 60 They also give a common sense
rationale for their holdings: a citizen should not have to wrestle an
offender to the ground while the police stand by.6 1 One opinion notes
that "[f]requently, as under the circumstances of this case, it is most
prudent for a private citizen to summon a police offer to assist in making
the arrest., 62 The other opinion also considers the rationale to be
uncontroversial: "Common sense and the case law both agree that the
63
private citizen effecting an arrest may summon the police to his aid.",
In the latter case, the court also notes that "[i]t would appear ludicrous to
hold [the arrest illegal] because [the citizen] was afraid to drag
respondent out of her car and arrest her unassisted., 64 Instead the citizen
"very wisely.., chose to enlist the aid of the police in effectuating the
65
arrest rather than risking his own safety."

parked, then went in search of an officer, and returned to the scene with the officer to make the
arrest); People v. Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding delegated citizen's
arrest legal where school security guard broke up fight, took victim into the school for treatment,
and pointed out fleeing offender to police who then took offender into custody); People v. Sjosten,
68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 834-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding delegated citizen's arrest legal where
citizen observed offense from her window, called police, continued to observe offender, and
instructed police to place him in custody upon their arrival).
57. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 369-71; Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 836 ("The fact [that the citizen]
did not physically confront appellant is not significant.").
58. See Roland K., 147 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (authorizing "transfer of custody" from citizen to officer
(citing Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 118)); Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (authorizing "delegation
of the 'physical act of custody'" (quoting Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 836)); Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at
836 (discussing the authority to delegate "the physical act" of taking an offender into custody).
59. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371; Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
60. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371; Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
61. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371; Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
62. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
63. Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
64. Id.
65. Id.

440

Delegated Citizen's Arrests
C.

Moxie Did Not Explicitly Define the Scope of Delegated Citizen's
Arrests

Although the court in Moxie adopted the delegated citizen's arrest
doctrine, the opinion did not clearly establish the scope of the doctrine
under Alaska law. Specifically, Moxie does not describe how much
arrest responsibility a citizen may delegate to an officer who did not
witness the offense before the arrest ceases to be a valid citizen's arrest
and becomes an invalid police arrest.66 In Moxie, all that remained for
the officer to do was to handcuff the offender.6 7 These facts are so
straightforward that another court considering the case might have held
that the citizen's arrest was complete when Mr. Moxie was restrained
before the officer arrived.68
The court's only guidance as to the scope of the doctrine is found in
its statement that "it is not the sole responsibility of a person making a
citizen's arrest to subdue, control, and transport the arrestee into the
formal custody of the state., 69 Although this guidance appears vague, all
the duties listed involve danger of physical resistance by the arrestee.7 °
Additionally, Moxie fails to explain how to distinguish between a
citizen making an arrest and a citizen-witness reporting a crime. 71 In
Moxie, there was no question that Ms. Robinson had initiated the arrest
66. See Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990, 990-91 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
67. See id. at 991.
68. See, e.g., Moll v. United States, 413 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding citizen's
arrest complete and legal under Florida law where woman saw man with his hand in her purse,
asked what he was doing, chased him out of the building, and apprehended him with the help of
bystanders before the police arrived); People v. Harris, 63 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851-52 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (holding citizen's arrest complete and legal where citizen witnessed hit-and-run, followed
offender, pulled him over, and told him to wait for the police to arrive).
69. Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991 (emphasis added).
70. See id.
71. The court did not appear to consider it dispositive that the citizen in Moxie signed a "citizen's
arrest form." See id. Signing a "citizen's arrest form" is unlikely to automatically turn an ordinary
witness into an "arresting citizen" because Alaska law defines "arrest" as "the taking of a person
into custody in order that the person may be held to answer for the commission of a crime." ALASKA
STAT. § 12.25.160 (2006). Alaska courts have strictly interpreted this statute, see Lindsay v. State,
698 P.2d 659, 663 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), and are unlikely to find that a citizen has "initiated"
arrest without taking steps towards placing the suspect into custody. Most likely, citizen's arrest
forms are used simply for police liability and record-keeping purposes. See Johanson v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding citizen's arrest form did not
constitute dispositive evidence of the charge for which offender was arrested). It is possible that a
court could also consider a signed citizen's arrest form an "express request" by a citizen that the
police take an offender into custody. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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because the offender had already been physically restrained. 72 Although
Moxie lists responsibilities a citizen may share with officers (subdue,
control, and transport), it does not say what responsibilities a citizen
must retain in order to make a citizen's arrest.
D.

Alaska Police CurrentlyMake Delegated Citizen's Arrests Despite
Moxie's Lack of Clarity

Moxie was decided in 1983 and remains the sole guidance from the
Alaska courts regarding delegated citizen's arrests. This lack of judicial
review may be partially explained by the fact that misdemeanor
defendants often plead guilty rather than take their cases to trial. 73 Of
those misdemeanor defendants who do go to trial, few appeal.74
Furthermore, an illegal arrest by itself cannot be appealed.75
Despite Moxie's unclear scope, Alaskan police currently make
warrantless "citizen's arrests" in a wide variety of circumstances. 76 The
two examples discussed in the introduction 77 are both based on actual
arrests that display the breadth of interpretation given to Moxie in
Alaska.
In sum, in adopting the delegated citizen's arrest doctrine in Alaska,
Moxie relied on California case law. Moxie and the California courts
72. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 990-91.
73. See Steven Zeidman, Police the Police: the Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 321 (2005) (asserting that, due to the very low rate at which misdemeanor
cases go to trial, "[o]nce an officer makes an arrest, it is for all intents and purposes insulated from
any meaningful challenge or review"); see also Rachael King, Bush Justice: The Intersection of
Alaska Natives and the Criminal Justice System in Rural Alaska, 77 OR. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998)
(discussing possible cultural reasons for why no Alaska Native defendant ever took a misdemeanor
charge to trial in the author's career as a public defender in rural Alaska); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998) ("[F]ullyadjudicated cases may be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authorities.");
John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S.CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1228 (1994) ("[M]ost
of the defender's clients will plead guilty, often at an early phase of the process.").
74. See JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 185055, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999

WITH TRENDS 1985-99, at 2-3 (1999) (reporting that in 1999, only five percent of misdemeanor
convictions in federal courts were appealed); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and
Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 105 (1977).
75. See People v. Richards, 140 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) ("An illegal arrest,
alone, is utterly irrelevant.").
76. See, e.g., JUNEAU POLICE DEP'T, supra note 16, Pt. 3, Ch. "Arrest--Citizen's Arrest."
77. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. The author has examined police reports of seven
factually complex delegated citizen's arrests from Alaska, spanning a three-month period in 2006.
The examples in this Comment were adapted from police reports of closed cases. These reports are
on file with the author. All potentially identifying information and details have been removed.
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indicate that a citizen may delegate physically dangerous arrest
responsibilities to police officers when making valid citizen's arrests.
The two examples presented above, based upon actual arrests,
demonstrate that a wide range of misdemeanor arrests are currently
justified as delegated citizen's arrests in Alaska.
III. CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE DEFINED THE SCOPE OF
DELEGATED CITIZEN'S ARRESTS
California courts have imposed two limitations on the scope of
delegated citizen's arrests.7 8 First, California applies the common law
prohibition on unnecessary delay to delegated citizen's arrests. 79 Second,
California courts also require the citizen to show intent to arrest by
taking substantial action to further the arrest, summoning police, and
giving specific information to the officer.8 °
A.

CaliforniaCourts Prohibitthe Arresting Citizenfrom Delaying
UnnecessarilyBetween Witnessing the Misdemeanor and Making
the Arrest

California cases indicate that the common law prohibition on
unnecessary delay applies to delegated citizen's arrests in the same way
it applies to other warrantless misdemeanor arrests. Two of the cases
cited in Moxie specifically refer to the delay prohibition. 81 The arrests in
both cases were deemed valid even though the citizen did not
82
immediately physically arrest the offender upon witnessing the crime.
78. See People v. Richards, 140 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding purported
delegated citizen's arrest invalid where citizen left the police to act independently when they
arrived). The California Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the validity of the delegated
citizen's arrest doctrine, but has upheld an arrest factually similar to a delegated citizen's arrest. See
People v. Wolfgang, 221 P. 907, 911 (Cal. 1923).
79. See People v. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
80. See People v. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). People v. Johnson,
decided two years before, was not cited in Moxie.
81. See Green v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 137 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) ("[H]e
did secure the aid of a police officer as promptly as possible."); Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 836
("Promptness, clearly exhibited here, is the only remaining requirement of a valid citizen's arrest for
a misdemeanor without a warrant.").
82. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371 ("Respondent was arrested within 35 to 40 minutes of the
time that [the citizen] saw her enter her driveway"); Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 834-36 (describing
chain of events between when the citizen witnessed the crime and when police took physical
custody of the offender, and later concluding that the arrest did not violate the delay prohibition).
Although People v. Campbell does not mention the delay prohibition specifically, the court found
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The citizens in those cases delayed physical arrest to wait for the arrival
of the police,83 which is generally considered necessary delay.84
The delay prohibition also forbids a citizen from going about business
unrelated to the arrest before the arrest is complete. In order for a
delegated citizen's arrest to be valid, the citizen must remain focused on
accomplishing the arrest even after seeking and receiving the help of the
police.86 In one of the California cases cited in Moxie, the court upheld a
delegated citizen's arrest where the citizen left the scene in order to
locate an officer, but rejoined the police at the scene directly
afterwards. 87 In its holding, the court specifically referred to the common
law delay prohibition, noting that "[t]his is not a case where the citizen
observing the offense went about
his other business and then later
88
decided to effectuate an arrest."
B.

CaliforniaCourts Require that the Arresting Citizen Show Intent to
Arrest by Taking SubstantialAction to Furtherthe Arrest

California courts require that, in order to effectuate a valid delegated
citizen's arrest, the citizen show intent to arrest. 89 Although the
California cases do not precisely define the "intent" requirement, a close
reading of the case law indicates that the citizen must both engage in
substantial action to further the arrest and provide
certain information to
90
offense.
the
and
offender
the
about
the police
the arrest legal despite the fact that the citizen took the victim to get medical attention before
making efforts to apprehend the offender. See 104 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
83. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371; Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 834-36.
84. Cf Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 677-78 (Alaska 1969); see also Ogulin v. Jeffries, 263 P.2d
75, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
85. Cf Herrin, 449 P.2d at 677-78 ("In order to justify a delay, there should be a continued
attempt on the part of the officer or person apprehending the offender to make the arrest; he cannot
delay for any purpose which is foreign to the accomplishment of the arrest." (quoting Jackson v.
Superior Court, 219 P.2d 879, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950))).
86. See Sjosten 68 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35 (finding delegated citizen's arrest legal where citizen,
after calling the police, continued to watch the offender until the police took physical custody of the
offender).
87. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
88. Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
89. See People v. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Richards, 140
Cal. Rptr. 158, 159-60 (Cal, Ct. App. 1977).
90. See Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (finding delegated citizen's arrest legal where citizen
witnessed the offense, followed the offender, and then reported the offense and pointed out the
offender's whereabouts to the police). Although the court in Moxie indicated that it "agreed"
generally with California case law in this area, it did not specifically cite Johnson or Richards as
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The intent requirement is twofold. First, although it is not necessary
that the citizen physically confront the offender, 9' the citizen must take
some action towards apprehending the offender. This requirement can be
satisfied by such action as verbally confronting the offender 92 or
93
watching and following the offender until custodial arrest by police.
Second, the citizen must summon the police to the scene and be able to
identify the offender to the police, giving the offender's whereabouts if
necessary. 94 The intent requirement serves to distinguish between a
citizen making a delegated citizen's arrest and a citizen who merely calls
the police to report witnessing a crime.95
In sum, California requires that citizens act with intent and without
delay in order to make valid delegated citizen's arrests. When the citizen
simply reports a crime to the police and leaves them to act
independently, the arrest is not a valid citizen's arrest. The citizen must
remain focused on the arrest from start to finish, taking substantial action
to further the arrest and giving specific information to the police so that
they may take the offender into custody.
IV. ALASKA SHOULD APPLY CALIFORNIA'S LIMITS ON THE
DELEGATED CITIZEN'S ARREST DOCTRINE
As Moxie agreed with California case law when it adopted the
delegated citizen's arrest doctrine, and the limitations found in
California case law comport with Moxie's legal holding and rationale,
Alaska should apply California's limitations on the delegated citizen's
arrest doctrine. Specifically, Alaska should apply the common law delay
prohibition to delegated citizen's arrests and require that citizens show
intent to arrest, rather than leaving the police to act independently.
Applying these limitations supports the underlying policy rationale of
citizen safety. Delegated citizen's arrests are proper where the police
give physical assistance to a citizen making an otherwise valid arrest.

examples. Another case discussing intent to arrest was decided three years after Moxie. Padilla v.
Meese, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
91. See People v. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
92. See Padilla,229 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
93. See Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
94. See id.
95. See Richards, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (finding insufficient evidence of intent to arrest where
citizen called police to report a crime but left to the officers the decision of whether to arrest the
offender). People v. Richards, decided six years before Moxie, was not cited in Moxie.
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The Citizen May Not Delay Unnecessarilyor Go About Unrelated
Business Between Witnessing the Misdemeanor and Completion of
the Arrest

Like California, Alaska should apply the common law prohibition on
unnecessary delay to delegated citizen's arrests just as it does to all other
warrantless misdemeanor arrests.96 Both Alaska and California follow
the common law rule that unless delay furthers a warrantless arrest, it
invalidates it.97 California also applies the rule to delegated citizen's
arrests.98 Alaska, which followed California law in adopting the
delegated citizen's arrest doctrine, should do so as well.
Applying the delay prohibition to delegated citizen's arrests is
consistent with Moxie, which allows citizens making valid arrests to
seek police assistance. 99 Both the court in Moxie and the California
courts intend for citizens to seek police help in potentially dangerous
situations.' 00 Courts in both states have held delay necessary when it
ensures physical safety.' 0 ' In Alaska, like California, 102 summoning and
waiting for police assistance in the context of delegated citizen's arrests
should be considered necessary delay.
Alaska should also apply the rule that a citizen may not go about
business unrelated to the arrest even after calling the police, but must
continue efforts to make the arrest with police assistance. 0 3 In California
cases upholding delegated citizen's arrests, the citizen is focused on the
14
arrest from the time of observing the crime through custodial arrest. 0
96. See Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 677-78 (Alaska 1969).
97. See id.; Jackson v. Superior Court, 219 P.2d 879, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
98. See People v. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
99. See Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990, 991 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
100. See id.; Green v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 137 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
("[The citizen] very wisely ... chose to enlist the aid of the police in effectuating the arrest rather
than risking his own safety."); Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
101. See People v. Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding arrest valid
where citizen helped victim before attempting to apprehend offender); see also Herrin, 449 P.2d at
676-78 (holding that delay to remove woman from building for her safety was necessary).
102. See People v. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding arrest legal
where citizen located the offender and then returned home to wait for the police to arrive); Green,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71 (holding arrest legal where citizen left the offender at the scene to get
police assistance).
103. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
104. See, e.g., Padilla v. Meese, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding delegated
citizen's arrest valid where citizen told drunk driver to pull over and waited with him for the arrival
of the police).
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Even in cases where the citizen is separated from the offender when the
police arrive, 10 5 the citizen should be physically present when the
officers take custody of the offender. 10 6 When the police arrive, the
citizen should not simply go on
about the citizen's business and allow
0 7
the police to act independently.1
The fact patterns discussed in the introduction illustrate the delay
prohibition. In the first scenario, a citizen saw a trespasser on her
property and called the police.'0 8 She told the police about the trespasser,
09
and they located him forty-five minutes later' about five miles away.
The police took him to jail, justifying his warrantless arrest as a
"citizen's arrest."
The citizen in this example delayed unnecessarily by abandoning her
efforts to make an arrest after speaking to the police. She went about
other business before her citizen's arrest was complete. Although she
called the police promptly, she then ceased to focus on the arrest after
105. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86 (holding arrest legal where, after citizen told the police
where to find the suspect, the police returned the suspect to the citizen's home so that the citizen
could complete the arrest); Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (holding arrest legal where police returned
the citizen to the suspect after the citizen had gone to look for help in order to place the suspect
under arrest).
106. See, e.g., Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86 (holding delegated citizen's arrest legal where
citizen left offender to summon police but was present at custodial arrest); Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at
370 (holding delegated citizen's arrest legal where citizen was separated from offender but present
at the offender's custodial arrest by police). This is also true in other states. See State v. Sutherland,
943 P.2d 62, 65-66 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (holding delegated citizen's arrest valid where citizen
informed police officer after fight that she wished to arrest her attacker, and accompanied both
officer and attacker to the police station to make the arrest); Burke v. State, 125 P.3d 685, 686
(Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (holding delegated citizen's arrest valid where citizen followed drunk driver,
confronted him, continued to follow him when he refused to stop driving, parked when he did, and
waited in her car for the police to arrive while suspect went into a restaurant).
107. See Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35 (holding arrest legal where citizen continued to watch
from her window from witnessing the crime, through arrival of police, until custody was complete);
Sutherland,943 P.2d at 65-66; Burke, 125 P.3d at 686.
108. See Trespasser Fact Pattern, supra note I.
109. See Trespasser Fact Pattern, supra note 1; cf. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87 (holding
citizen's arrest valid where "the entire sequence of events ... consum[ed] ... little more than 10

minutes"); Ogulin v. Jeffries, 263 P.2d 75, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (holding citizen's arrest valid
where "only about twenty minutes elapsed"); Hill v. Levy, 256 P.2d 622, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)
(holding citizen's arrest valid where, according to varying testimony, between five and twenty-five
minutes elapsed between the offense and custodial arrest); cf also Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371
(holding citizen's arrest valid where "[riespondent was arrested within 35 to 40 minutes").
110. Cf Warren v. State, Nos. 3506, A-5831, 1996 WL 685757, *1-2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 27,
1996) (holding police arrest illegal where officer on his way to another scene saw offender commit
misdemeanor of riding bicycle on sidewalk, but did not complete arrest until forty-five minutes later
after returning from the first scene).
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calling the police. In short, she behaved like a witness reporting a crime.
By the time the offender was placed under arrest by the police, she had
forfeited her own authority to arrest. To hold her minimal interest in the
arrest sufficient to justify a citizen's arrest undermines the warrant
requirement and grants the police broad authority to independently make
warrantless misdemeanor arrests based only on a citizen's report of a
crime.
In the arrest of the shoplifter, the delay between the crime and
custody was necessary because it was spent waiting for police assistance
and in fresh pursuit of the offender." 1 In that example, store employees
called the police after a shoplifter whom they had escorted to the front of
the store shoved past them and escaped.1 12 The employees told the
officer that the offender ran into a building across the street. The officer
then chased the offender down and brought him back to the store for
identification." 13 The delay in this example furthers a policy of the
delegated arrest doctrine implicit in Moxie-namely, to ensure the
physical safety of a citizen engaged in a citizen's arrest. Here, the
citizens promptly called the police after the offender physically resisted
their attempts to take him into custody, told the police where the
offender had fled, and allowed the responding officer to take over
pursuit.
In sum, in order to effectuate the policy underlying the delegated
citizen's arrest doctrine announced in Moxie and to preserve the
distinction between legal citizen's arrests and illegal police arrests,
Alaska should prohibit unnecessary delay on the part of the arresting
citizen. Such a prohibition would forbid citizens from going about
business unrelated to the accomplishment of the arrest from the time
they witness the crime until police take the offender into custody. The
duty to avoid delay is not extinguished by securing police assistance, and
citizens must continue to focus on the arrest until it is complete.
Generally speaking, citizens must both continue their involvement after

11.

See Shoplifter Fact Pattern, supra note 2; cf Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 678 (Alaska

1969).
112. Cf People v. Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding arrest
legal where security guard broke up fight, took victim to get medical treatment, and pointed out the
fleeing offender to officers who chased the offender down).
113. Cf Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (holding arrest legal where citizen located offender and
told police where to find him, and the police then picked up offender and returned him to the
citizen's home for identification).
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summoning police and be present during arrest in order to make a valid
delegated citizen's arrest.
B.

Alaska Should Apply California'sIntent Law to Require that
Arresting Citizens Take SubstantialAction to Furtherthe Arrest

Like California, Alaska should consider whether a citizen has shown
intent to arrest. This requires taking substantial action to further the
arrest and giving sufficient information to the police. Moxie did not
explain how to distinguish a citizen making a delegated citizen's arrest
from a citizen-witness merely reporting a misdemeanor. However the
court did express approval of the California delegated citizen's arrest
15
doctrine," 4 which uses an intent requirement for this purpose.1
Furthermore, the California intent requirement is consistent with
Moxie's language and policy.11 6 Applying California's intent
requirement in Alaska is consistent with Moxie and would serve to
protect Alaska's warrant requirement.
California requires that citizens actively involve themselves in
delegated arrests, rather than simply calling the police and leaving them
to proceed independently." 7 Moxie speaks of the officer "aiding" the
114. See Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990, 991 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). Moxie looked to California
cases to support delegated citizen's arrests generally, but did not cite as examples either Johnson or
Richards, the two California cases on intent at that time. Padilla was decided three years after
Moxie. Padilla v. Meese, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
115. See Padilla, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 316; Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686; People v. Richards, 140
Cal. Rptr. 158, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). There is a difference between Moxie and Johnson that is
worth mentioning. Moxie refers to the citizen's "express request" that the officer take the offender
into custody. Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991. However, Johnson indicates that the citizen's request that the
officer take the offender into custody need not be express. Instead it can be implied from the
citizen's demonstrated "intent" that the offender be arrested. See Johnson 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686
("The citizen's request need not, however, be express, but may be implied by the citizen's
conduct .... ); see also Padilla229 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16 (holding delegated citizen's arrest legal
despite the fact that the arresting citizen lacked subjective intent to arrest as he did not know he had
the authority to make a citizen's arrest). In Padilla, the citizen stopped a drunk driver, told him to
pull over and wait for police, reported the offense, and turned the driver over to police when they
arrived. Although he never expressly requested that the police take the offender into custody for
him, the courts found his actions sufficient to be an implied request. See Padilla,229 Cal. Rptr. at
315-16. Because the citizen in Moxie did make an express request that the police arrest the
offender, it is unclear from Moxie's holding if the citizen's express request is critical to the
outcome. This question may be rendered moot where the citizen completes a "citizen's arrest form,"
which a court could consider an "express request" that the offender be taken into custody. See supra
note 71.
116. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991.
117. See Richards, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
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citizen and of the officer as the "agent" of the arresting citizen.' 18 This
language implies that the citizen should be the decision-maker and
driving force behind the arrest. Moxie refers to the scope of delegation in
terms of physical tasks: to "subdue, control, and transport the arrestee
into the formal custody of the state." '"1 9 Moxie further notes that these
duties are not the "sole responsibility of a person making a citizen's
arrest .... ,,120 This language does not completely relieve the citizen of
any arrest responsibilities nor does it allow the police to take over the
situation entirely. Consistent with this language, the citizen should be
required to take on responsibility for the arrest by directing the actions of
the police, showing the kind of "intent" required by California courts to
make a valid delegated citizen's arrest.
This standard for intent renders results consistent with the prohibition
against unnecessary delay. As described above, this prohibition requires
that the citizen focus on the arrest from the time of witnessing the crime
through custodial arrest of the offender.' 2 ' For example, in the trespasser
fact pattern discussed above, the arrest is invalid under both the
standards for delay and intent. In that case, the long delay between the
crime and the arrest occurred because the citizen ceased to focus on the
arrest after speaking to the police, leaving the officer to independently
locate and identify the offender. 122 After speaking to the police, the
23
citizen could have safely followed the trespasser in her car.1
Alternatively, she could have requested that he wait until the arrival of
the police. 24 She did not show sufficient intent to make her an arresting
citizen as defined by California case law and consistent with the
purposes of Moxie.
To define the trespasser's arrest a valid delegated citizen's arrest is to
effectively eliminate the common law rule, codified by statute in Alaska,

118. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See supra Part IV.A.
122. See Trespasser Fact Pattern, supra note 1.
123. Cf, e.g., People v. Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. 684, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding arrest
legal where citizen saw prowler, called police, went out in his car, located the offender, and returned
home to report the offender's location to the police); Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70 (holding arrest
legal where citizen followed DUI suspect in her car until she parked); Burke v. State, 125 P.3d 685,
686 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (same).
124. Padilla v. Meese, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (arresting citizen requested
that drunk driving offender pull over and park while citizen called police).
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requiring the police to obtain an arrest warrant for misdemeanors they
did not personally witness. It would legalize warrantless police arrests
based solely on citizen reports of misdemeanor offenses, thus
undercutting the warrant requirement. The exception for delegated
citizen's arrests would become an exception allowing warrantless police
arrest in response to any crime report by a witness.
This standard for intent also yields consistent results in the example
of the shoplifter. 125 In that arrest, the citizens had confronted the
offender and taken him to the front of the store at which point he
escaped and ran away. 26 They then called the police and were present to
identify the offender when he was taken into custody by the responding
officer. 27 Unlike the citizen in the arrest of the trespasser, who left the
police to act independently after calling 911, the store employees gave
specific instructions to the police and were present for the custodial
arrest.
C.

California'sLimitations Comport with Moxie's Policy
Underpinnings:Physical Safety of a Citizen Making an Arrest
Justifies PoliceAssistance

The California cases cited in Moxie demonstrate concern with
ensuring the physical safety of the arresting citizen. 128 The California
courts, and other states' courts, describe this policy concern explicitly,
indicating that a citizen who wishes to make an arrest should not be
prevented from doing so just because she is "afraid" to physically
subdue the offender. 29 Moxie agreed with the California courts'

125. See Shoplifter Fact Pattern, supra note 2; cf.Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
126. Cf People v. Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding arrest legal
where citizen security guard broke up fight, assisted victim, and pointed out fleeing suspect to
officers who took him into custody).
127. Cf Johnson, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (citizen present for custodial arrest); Green, 137 Cal.
Rptr. at 371 (same).
128. See supra Part lI.B.
129. See Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371 ("It would appear ludicrous to hold that appellant cannot
protect the motoring public by suspending respondent's license based on the uncontradicted facts set
forth above, because [the citizen] was afraid to drag respondent out of her car and arrest her
unassisted."); Burke v. State, 125 P.3d 685, 689 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) ("[The citizen] wished to
place [the offender] under citizen's arrest, and-being understandably afraid to approach [the
offender] herself-accepted the officer's assistance in notifying him of his arrest and taking him
into custody.").
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reasoning. 30 The language of the decision reflects this
policy, referring
13
to delegation in terms of physically dangerous duties. '
The standards for intent and delay further effectuate this policy by
requiring the arresting citizen to be the driving force behind the arrest
throughout, without exposing the citizen to potential physical resistance
from offenders. The standards for intent and delay ensure that the citizen
makes the arrest while not restricting police assistance that protects the
citizen. For example, police can assist with physically dangerous tasks,
such as taking over hot pursuit of a fleeing offender from a citizen, 32
without violating these requirements. In such
cases the officer's
33
assistance makes the arrest safer for the citizen.'
The prohibition on unnecessary delay and standards for intent yield
results consistent with Moxie's policy concerns when applied to the
example arrests described above. In the example of the trespasser, the
offender was docile and had already left when the citizen spoke to the
police. The assistance of the officers in that case did not physically
protect her. She was not asking for assistance in confronting and
subduing a stranger or dangerous individual. 134 She was not chasing a
fleeing suspect. 135 She did not appear to have any intent to arrest the
offender herself, and did not participate in the arrest at all.
In the example of the shoplifter, however, the officer's involvement
made the situation safer for the citizens. In that arrest, the shoplifter was
taken to the front of the store, where he pushed past an employee and ran
off. The police officer, on the instruction of the citizens, subdued,
controlled, and transported the offender. 36 The citizens delegated the
physically dangerous aspects of the arrest to the officer, while taking full
responsibility for other arrest duties throughout.

130. See Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990, 991 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
131. See Moxie, 662 P.2d at 991 ("it is not the sole responsibility of a person making a citizen's
arrest to subdue, control and transport the arrestee into the formal custody of the state").
132. See People v. Campbell, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (finding arrest legal
where officers chased down fleeing offender for citizen).
133. See Burke, 125 P.3d at 689.
134. Cf Sutherland,943 P.2d at 66 (describing in detail the physical danger to the citizen posed
by the "irate" and "highly intoxicated" arrestee, who had already physically assaulted the citizen);
Burke, 125 P.3d at 686 (describing the conduct of the offender when confronted by citizen on the
road as "intoxicated," "yelling," and "belligerent").
135. Cf People v. Wolfgang, 221 P. 907, 911 (Cal. 1923).
136. Cf Moxie v. State, 662 P.2d 990, 991 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Alaska should apply California's limits on delegated citizen's arrests.
These limits protect Alaska's warrant requirement and are consistent
with Moxie's legal holding and policy concerns. Alaska should require
citizens to act with intent and without delay in order to make a valid
delegated citizen's arrests. The citizen should not merely report the
crime and then allow the police to act independently. 37 Adopting these
doctrines does not frustrate the policy behind the delegated citizen's
arrest doctrine of making the situation safer for the arresting citizen.
These limits clarify the delegated citizen's arrest doctrine in Alaska in
accordance with Moxie and Alaska law.

137. Although not mentioned in the cases, another reason for using citizen involvement to
distinguish between citizen and police arrest is that making a citizen's arrest exposes the citizen to
liability for false arrest. See Hill v. Levy, 256 P.2d 622, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (finding arresting
citizen not liable in action for false arrest). If a citizen calls the police, and the police take over the
arrest process, a citizen may think that the police have also assumed legal responsibility for the
arrest. Furthermore, citizens in these cases may not fully understand that the police could make the
arrest if they obtained a warrant. Although the courts do not comment on it, in a handful of cases the
police have incorrectly represented to the citizen that the offender cannot be arrested unless the
citizen makes the arrest. See Atkins v. Alameda, No. C-03-3566 MHP, 2006 WL 1600651, *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 7, 2006) ("[The officer] told [the citizens] that the only way that plaintiff could be arrested
is if they put him under citizen's arrest."); Green, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 370 ("The officers there told him
that they did not have the power to arrest respondent and the only way she could be arrested was if
[he] were to make a citizen's arrest."); State v. Sutherland, 943 P.2d 62, 65 (Idaho 1997) ("Officer
Bauer told Gomaa that if she wanted Sutherland arrested for misdemeanor battery, she would have
to perform a citizen's arrest."). In each cited case, the officer in fact could have arrested the offender
by obtaining a warrant.
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